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Threshold Inquiry for Exactions 
Winfield B. Martin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For decades prior to 2005,1 Fifth Amendment regulatory takings ju-
risprudence languished in a state of confused neglect. Rather than articu-
lating a clearly discernable standard for determining whether a violation 
of the Takings Clause had occurred, Justices rebuffed government action 
that seemed to amount to “an out-and-out plan of extortion”2 and nodded 
in approval when they deemed the government to have “acted diligently 
and in good faith”3 or in furtherance of a “compelling interest.”4 In trying 
to parse this imprecise thicket, scholars have characterized the Court’s 
approach to regulatory takings as a “muddle,”5 in “disarray,”6 and “inco-
herent.”7 Professor Kent even noted that it is “now axiomatic” that this 
period of regulatory takings jurisprudence is considered a “constitutional 
quagmire.”8 
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 1. See infra Part II. 
 2. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (quoting J.E.D. Assoc., Inc. v. 
Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14–15 (N.H. 1981)). 
 3. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 333 (1992). 
 4. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 232 (2003) (rejecting a takings challenge to 
an IOLTA program due to its “dramatic success” in providing legal services to the needy). 
 5. Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 561, 561 (1984). 
 6. Andrea L. Peterson, The Taking Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I-A Cri-
tique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1304 (1989). 
 7. James R. Gordley, Takings: What Does Matter? A Response to Professor Penalver, 31 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 291, 291 (2004). 
 8. Michael B. Kent, Jr., Construing the Canon: An Exegesis of Regulatory Takings Jurispru-
dence After Lingle v. Chevron, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 63, 64 (2008) (quoting Mark W. Cordes, 
Takings Jurisprudence as Three-Tiered Review, 20 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL L. J. 1 (2006)). 
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During this period of inexactitude, the Court relied upon the formu-
la it had articulated in Agins v. City of Tiburon9 to determine if a regula-
tory taking had occurred. Under Agins, a taking may occur if regulation 
“does not substantially advance legitimate state interests.”10 
It was under the Agins regime that the Court decided Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission11 and Dolan v. City of Tigard,12 twin 
decisions that constitute the entirety of the Court’s evaluation of exac-
tions of any type. An exaction is a condition that the government places 
upon a property owner in exchange for permission to develop his land—
typically, an exaction requires that a landowner dedicate either money or 
property to public use to offset the increased burden of development.13 
Combined, Nollan and Dolan mandate that a regulation is not a taking 
only if there is an “essential nexus”14 between the exaction and the im-
pact caused by the proposed development, and the exaction is “rough[ly] 
proportional”15 to the development’s impact. When Nollan and Dolan 
were decided in 1987 and 1994, respectively, it was presumed that they 
extended the Agins “substantial advancement” formulation. With only 
two exactions cases to assist them, however, lower courts had difficulty 
applying Nollan and Dolan with consistency. Particularly stringent disa-
greement arose as to what types of exactions the Nollan/Dolan standard 
properly applied to. The Nollan and Dolan cases concerned 
adjudicatively imposed exactions—that is, conditions imposed upon de-
velopment on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis.16 Without further guidance, 
some lower courts elected to apply Nollan and Dolan to legislative17 and 
                                                 
 9. 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (holding that restrictive rezoning of appellants’ property substantially 
advanced legitimate state goals by preserving open-space land in urban areas). 
 10. Id. at 260. 
 11. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 12. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
 13. For example, an exaction could require that a massive residential development include land 
dedicated to parks or recreation to offset the confiscation of open green space. Also, a retail devel-
opment could be required to pay for the reconfiguration of a nearby intersection to mitigate in-
creased traffic flow. 
 14. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
 15. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
 16. Adjudicatively imposed exactions are typically levied by administrative bodies, such as 
municipal planning commissions, and are frequently assessed to comport with state or municipal 
statutory requirements. In Dolan, for instance, the City of Tigard’s City Planning Commission made 
an individualized determination that the petitioner dedicate roughly seven thousand square feet of 
her proposed development to a pedestrian and bicycle pathway. Id. at 380. The Commission assessed 
the exaction to comply with square foot limitations for paving and structures included in Tigard’s 
Community Development Code (CDC). Id. at 377–78. The CDC itself had been promulgated at the 
behest of a comprehensive land use management program enacted by the Oregon legislature. Id. at 
377. 
 17. One example of a legislative exaction is the City of Scottsdale’s decision to impose a water 
resources development fee as a condition on all new development. Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. 
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monetary exactions as well, while others declined and chose to utilize 
alternative tests.18 
The confusion in applying its takings jurisprudence did not go un-
noticed by the Court. When it decided Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.19 in 
2005, the Court wryly noted that “our regulatory takings jurisprudence 
cannot be characterized as unified.”20 The Court took the opportunity in 
Lingle to resurvey its takings jurisprudence, reaching all the way back to 
its 1922 decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.21 Though Lingle 
itself was not an exactions case, it nonetheless considered the entirety of 
takings jurisprudence and discussed Nollan and Dolan at length.22 In re-
considering and streamlining its takings jurisprudence, the Court whittled 
decisively away at the very underpinnings of that body of law: that, per 
Agins, a taking cannot be effected if the regulation substantially advances 
a legitimate state interest.23 The Court rejected the Agins language due to 
its limited ability to “help to identify those regulations whose effects are 
functionally comparable to government appropriation or invasion of pri-
vate property.”24 Instead, Lingle re-characterized Nollan and Dolan—
and, therefore, evaluations of exactions—as an application of the doc-
trine of unconstitutional conditions.25 That doctrine dictates that “the 
government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right—
here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a 
public use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the 
government where the benefit has little or no relationship to the proper-
ty.”26 
This Comment argues that the Court’s recalibrated view of Nollan 
and Dolan as applications of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions 
                                                                                                             
Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 994 (Ariz. 1997). In order to construct a sustainable water 
supply infrastructure, which would balance the amount of water pumped out of and restored to the 
area’s aquifers, Scottsdale’s city council adopted an ordinance that levied a fee of $1,000 per single 
family residence, $600 per apartment unit, and $2,000 per acre foot of estimated water usage for 
other new uses. Id. at 995. The fees constituted an exaction because they contributed to the capital 
necessary to build a water system that would offset the burden of new development. Id. at 994–95. 
 18. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 902 P.2d 1347 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1995) (declining to apply Nollan/Dolan analysis because Dolan involved an adjudicative, 
rather than legislative, exaction). 
 19. 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
 20. Id. at 539. “This is, to say the least, an understatement.” James S. Burling & Graham Ow-
en, The Implications of Lingle on Inclusionary Zoning and Other Legislative and Monetary Exac-
tions, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 399 n.5 (2009). 
 21. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 22. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546–48. 
 23. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
 24. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 529. 
 25. Id. at 530. 
 26. Id. at 547. 
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suggests that nexus and proportionality standards should be applied to 
both legislatively and adjudicatively imposed exactions. Part II discusses 
the pre-Lingle state of exactions analysis and the debate regarding the 
appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to different types of exactions. Part 
III reviews the Lingle decision itself and its determination that Nollan 
and Dolan are based upon the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 
Part IV proposes a balancing test to resolve the difficult threshold inquiry 
of whether an exaction should be examined under heightened scrutiny. 
Part V revisits the Ninth Circuit’s holding in McClung v. City of Sumner 
that legislative exactions are outside of the Nollan/Dolan framework,27 
applying the balancing test in lieu of a formalistic determination. 
II. EXACTIONS IN THE PRE-LINGLE WORLD 
The proposition that a government regulation may violate the Tak-
ings Clause of the Fifth Amendment if it “goes too far” has existed since 
the Court’s 1922 opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.28 In Ma-
hon, Justice Holmes acknowledged that “government hardly could go on 
if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished 
without paying for every such change,” but noted concurrently that 
“when [a regulation] reaches a certain magnitude . . . there must be an 
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.”29 
Holmes added, a bit unhelpfully, that “the question depends upon the 
particular facts.”30 In a subsequent decision, Armstrong v. United States, 
the Court articulated the rationale behind its takings jurisprudence as an 
interest in “bar[ring] Government from forcing some people alone to 
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole.”31 But Holmes’s “too far” phrasing from Mahon,32 
even in conjunction with the rationale stated in Armstrong, created an 
imprecise standard that scholars criticized as a “we know it when we see 
it” scheme.33 This vagueness occasioned a procession of tests that were 
“created, used, and discarded”34 in an effort to create a more comprehen-
sible takings standard. 
The Court’s reluctance to enunciate bright-line rules to guide regu-
latory takings analysis led to the creation of four alternative tests that 
                                                 
 27. McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1227–28 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 28. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 29. Id. at 413. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 32. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. 
 33. Burling & Owen, supra note 20, at 402 (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188 
(1964)). 
 34. Id. 
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endure today. In Pennsylvania Central Transportation v. City of New 
York, the Court announced a deferential test that determines whether a 
regulation goes “too far” based upon a balancing of three factors: the 
economic impact of the regulation, the interference with the property 
owner’s investment-backed expectations, and the character of the regula-
tion.35 The Penn Central test is considered to be the most deferential of 
the four.36 The remaining three tests each subject the challenged govern-
ment action to higher scrutiny. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., the Court held that a regulation mandating a physical inva-
sion of privacy, regardless of the size of the invasion, constitutes a tak-
ing.37 The Court announced another categorical taking in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, which held that any regulation that strips 
property of all economically viable use effects a taking.38 Lastly, the 
combined Nollan/Dolan standard enjoins the government from requiring 
that a landowner dedicate property to public use in exchange for a devel-
opment permit unless the government is able to demonstrate that there is 
an essential nexus between the development’s impact and the dedication, 
and that the dedication is proportional to that impact.39 
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, property owners chal-
lenged the Commission’s practice of requiring landowners to trade ex-
clusive access to the beachfront portion of their property for building 
permits.40 The Nollans had sought permission to demolish their one-story 
bungalow and replace it with a two-story house.41 The Commission 
would grant the requisite permit only if the Nollans agreed to dedicate to 
public use the roughly one-third of the property that ran parallel to the 
ocean.42 It justified the requirement as a mechanism for offsetting the 
loss of ocean visibility to travelers on Highway 1, which ran behind the 
Nollans’ property, that would result if the height of the residence was 
increased.43 The Commission described the diminished visibility as a 
“psychological barrier.”44  
The Court, conversely, considered the Commission’s scheme an 
“out-and-out plan of extortion.”45 It rejected the Commission’s demand 
                                                 
 35. Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 36. Burling & Owen, supra note 20, at 403. 
 37. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 38. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 39. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 438 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 
U.S. 374, 371 (1994). 
 40. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827–28. 
 41. Id. at 828. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 838. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assoc., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14–15 (N.H. 1981)). 
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and announced that conditions of this nature are permissible only if cer-
tain conditions are present. First, the impact of the proposed development 
must, in and of itself, be sufficient to merit refusing the building per-
mit—a refusal that would not itself effect a taking.46 Second, as an alter-
native to flatly denying the building permit, a condition to granting the 
desired permit may be imposed that mitigates the adverse impact that 
would have justified denying the permit.47 In other words, there must be 
a nexus between the objectionable impact of a development and the ex-
action demanded of the landowner. In this case, the Court rejected the 
dedication demand on the ground that it bore no relationship to the loss 
of coastal views; the dedication would facilitate public beach access but 
would in no way improve visibility from the highway.48 “Constitutional 
propriety disappears,” the Court declared, “if the condition substituted 
for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justifi-
cation for the prohibition.”49 
The Court augmented the nexus requirement it created in Nollan 
when it decided Dolan v. City of Tigard. In Dolan, the owner of a hard-
ware and plumbing store sought a permit to expand the size of the shop.50 
The City of Tigard agreed to grant the permit only on the condition that 
the landowner dedicate a swath of the business’s land to public access 
and construct a bicycle trail on it with the stated goal of mitigating the 
anticipated increase in traffic attributable to the expansion.51 Though the 
Court conceded that, per Nollan, a nexus did exist between the impact of 
the proposed development and the exaction demanded by the City, it re-
buffed the exaction as lacking proportionality to the adverse impact.52 
The Court held that in addition to a showing of a nexus, the government 
“must make some sort of individualized determination that the required 
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the pro-
posed development.”53 Because the City could offer only vague, specula-
tive estimates about how much the required dedication would reduce 
                                                 
 46. Id. at 836–37. 
 47. Id. 
 48. The Court only briefly discussed the issue of whether refusing the Nollans a building per-
mit due to obstructed views from the highway would constitute a taking: “We assume, without de-
ciding . . . [that] the Commission unquestionably would be able to deny the Nollans their permit 
outright if their new house . . . would substantially impede [ocean views], unless the denial would 
interfere so drastically with the Nollans’ use of their property as to constitute a taking.” Id. at 835–
36. 
 49. Id. at 837. 
 50. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379–80 (1994). 
 51. Id. at 381–82. 
 52. Id. at 391. 
 53. Id. 
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traffic congestion, it could not demonstrate that the dedication was pro-
portional to the development’s impact.54 
Though the combined Nollan/Dolan requirements have been recog-
nized by lower courts as a “heightened scrutiny” standard for exactions,55 
the Supreme Court has provided no guidance for determining whether 
legislatively imposed exactions should be subjected to this level of scru-
tiny, or whether it should be reserved only for exactions imposed on an 
ad hoc basis. Given this absence of any indication, lower courts can 
make that determination only by examining the rationales that the Court 
has supplied for exactions jurisprudence. In both Nollan and Dolan, the 
Court provided some indication that its exactions tests were designed to 
further the Agins takings standard of a substantial advancement of a le-
gitimate state interest. Indeed, in Nollan the Court seemed to predicate 
the entire development of the nexus requirement upon a desire to clarify 
the Agins standard. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, notes early in 
his opinion that the Court’s decisions “have not elaborated on the stand-
ards for determining what constitutes a ‘legitimate state interest’ or what 
type of connection between the regulation and the state interest satisfied 
the requirement that the former ‘substantially advance’ the latter.”56 Sim-
ilarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist points out early in his majority opinion in 
Dolan that Agins finds that a regulation does not effect a taking if the 
regulation not only substantially advances a legitimate state interest, but 
also does not deny an owner economically viable use of his land.57 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist then quickly notes that the exaction imposed in Dolan 
in no way deprives the hardware store owner of the viable use of her 
land, and proceeds to tether the subsequent analysis to the “substantially 
advance” prong of Agins.58 The Court’s repeated desire, prior to Lingle, 
to create exactions jurisprudence that comports with the Agins substantial 
advancement standard suggests that legislatively imposed exactions 
should be eligible for the heightened scrutiny of the Nollan/Dolan nexus 
and proportionality requirements. If a legislatively imposed exaction that 
effected the same requirement as those discussed in Nollan and Dolan—
namely, that property owners give up property in exchange for a per-
mit—was upheld under a more relaxed scrutiny, then the permissibility 
                                                 
 54. “[T]he city has not met its burden of demonstrating that the additional number of vehicle 
and bicycle trips generated by petitioner’s development reasonably relate to the city’s requirement 
for a dedication . . . The city simply found that the creation of the pathway ‘could offset some of the 
traffic demand . . . and lessen the increase in traffic congestion.’” Id. at 395 (citation omitted). 
 55. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 443 (Cal. 1996). 
 56. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987). 
 57. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. 
 58. Id. 
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of an exaction would depend not upon its adherence to the Agins stand-
ard, but upon the mechanism used to impose it. 
The argument that the Court intended exactions that require proper-
ty to be relinquished to be eligible for analysis under heightened scrutiny 
is supported by the fact that, in Dolan, Chief Justice Rehnquist distin-
guishes only legislatively imposed exactions that “classif[y] entire areas 
of [a] city,”59 suggesting that the Nollan/Dolan analysis should be ap-
plied to more acute legislative exactions. Additionally, Burling and Ow-
en note that although advocates of a more relaxed scrutiny for legislative 
exactions point to footnote eight of Dolan to support the claim that the 
Court intended such exactions to be spared heightened scrutiny, that 
footnote’s language is qualified.60 Footnote eight distinguishes between 
“most generally applicable zoning conditions” and adjudicatively im-
posed exactions, noting that when evaluating the former, “the burden 
properly rests on the party challenging the regulation to prove that it con-
stitutes an arbitrary regulation of property rights.”61 However, the inclu-
sion of the word “most” implies that the Court “anticipated heightened 
review for at least some types of generally applicable legislation.”62 Burl-
ing and Owen reasonably venture that the Court intended to reserve 
heightened scrutiny for legislative exactions that impose the same types 
of exactions as the adjudicatively imposed ones in Nollan and Dolan.63 
Additionally, footnote eight cites Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Company64 to support its characterization of general zoning regulations. 
That case, though, did not involve the imposition of an exaction, and the 
legislation was met with a Fourteenth Amendment due process challenge 
rather than a Fifth Amendment takings one.65 
III. LINGLE AND THE NEW BASIS FOR NOLLAN AND DOLAN 
In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,66 a unanimous Supreme Court 
declared that although the “substantially advances” language “has been 
ensconced in our Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence,”67 the time 
had arrived for it to be dislodged. 
In Lingle, the Hawaii Legislature’s June 1997 enactment of Act 257 
limited the amount of rent that oil companies could charge lessee-dealers 
                                                 
 59. Id. 
 60. Burling & Owen, supra note 20, at 406. 
 61. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 n.8. 
 62. Burling & Owen, supra note 20, at 406. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 65. Id. at 384. 
 66. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
 67. Id. at 531–32. 
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that operated roughly 150 Hawaiian gas stations owned directly by oil 
companies.68 In response, Chevron sued the state’s Governor and Attor-
ney General on several grounds, including that the rent cap constituted a 
taking of Chevron’s property.69 During procedural wrangling, the parties 
agreed that Act 257 reduced the amount of rent that Chevron would be 
allowed to charge eleven of its sixty-four lessee-dealer stations by 
$207,000 per year, although the cap would theoretically enable Chevron 
to charge the remaining fifty-three lessee-dealer stations more rent than it 
otherwise would, for a net increase of rental revenue amongst all 64 sta-
tions of $1.1 million per year.70 
The district court granted Chevron’s motion for summary judgment 
on the ground that “Act 257 fails to substantially advance a legitimate 
state interest, and as such, effects an unconstitutional taking.”71 Though 
the district court conceded that the Act’s stated goal of preventing con-
centration of the retail gasoline market and suppressing high prices was a 
legitimate state interest, it concluded that the Act would not actually ef-
fect a reduction of lessee-dealers’ costs or retail prices.72 After initially 
vacating the grant of summary judgment and remanding the case for fur-
ther determination of fact as to whether the Act would benefit consum-
ers,73 the Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed summary judgment, concur-
ring with the district court that the Act effected an unconstitutional tak-
ing for failure to advance a legitimate state interest.74 
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Justice O’Connor, writ-
ing for the majority, began her analysis by attempting to situate Agins 
within the contemporary takings jurisprudence. She noted the per se tak-
ings tests enunciated in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan75 and Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council,76 labeling them, as well as exactions, 
                                                 
 68. Id. at 532–33. At the time Lingle was decided, roughly 300 service stations sold gasoline in 
the State of Hawaii. Id. Roughly half were operated through arrangements wherein an oil company 
would buy or lease land from a third party, build a service station, and then lease the station to a 
dealer. Id. The majority of Chevron’s Hawaiian gasoline sales were conducted at sixty-four stations 
operated in this manner. Id. Rent would be determined as a percentage of the dealer’s margin on 
sales. Id. Act 257 limited rent to fifteen percent of a dealer’s gross profits from gasoline sales plus 
fifteen percent of gross sales from other products. Id. at 533. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 534. 
 71. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1014 (D. Haw. 1998)). 
 72. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d at 1010. 
 73. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030, 1042 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 74. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 363 F.3d 846, 848 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 75. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 76. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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as “relatively narrow categories.”77 When neither of the per se takings 
tests apply, a regulatory taking should be evaluated under the Penn Cen-
tral framework, focusing on the economic impact of the regulation, inter-
ference with investment-backed expectations, and the character78 of the 
regulation.79 Agins, decided two years after Penn and before Lucas and 
Loretto, declared that “[t]he application of a general zoning law to par-
ticular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially 
advance legitimate state interests . . . or denies an owner economically 
viable use of his land.”80 Justice O’Connor takes special notice of the 
disjunctive language in Agins, which she asserts has allowed its “sub-
stantially advances” language to be read “to announce a stand-alone reg-
ulatory takings test that is wholly independent of Penn Central or any 
other test.”81 Indeed, both the Ninth Circuit and the district court relied 
solely upon the “substantially advances” prong of the Agins formulation 
to strike down Act 257, indicating that Agins has been used in practice 
not merely as a theoretical rationale for regulatory takings tests such as 
Penn Central and the per se tests of Loretto and Lucas, but as a discrete 
test of its own.82 
Prior to Lingle, the Court never had occasion to consider the validi-
ty of Agins “as a freestanding takings test.”83 Presented with the oppor-
tunity, the Court quickly and in no uncertain terms posits that the “sub-
stantially advances” formula in Agins was developed in reliance upon 
due process rather than takings jurisprudence.84 Justice O’Connor points 
out that to support its creation of the “substantially advances” language, 
the Court cited Nectow v. Cambridge85 and Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Company,86 which both involved zoning ordinances challenged on 
due process grounds.87 The “substantially advances” formulation mimics 
                                                 
 77. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 528, 538 (2005). Justice O’Connor reserves 
discussion of Nollan and Dolan and the “special context” of land-use exactions for later in her opin-
ion. 
 78. Justice O’Connor points to “whether [the regulation] amounts to a physical invasion or 
instead merely affects property interests through ‘some public program adjusting the benefits and 
burdens of economic life to promote the common good’” as an example of relevant “character.” Id. 
at 539 (quoting Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
 79. Id. at 538. 
 80. Id. at 540 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Pa. Cent., 438 U.S. 
at 138 n.6). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (“[T]he lower courts in this case struck down Hawaii’s rent control statute based solely 
upon their findings that it does not substantially advance a legitimate state interest.”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
 86. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 87. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540–41. 
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the holding in Euclid, quoted in Nectow, “that a municipal zoning ordi-
nance would survive a substantive due process challenge so long as it 
was not ‘clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial rela-
tion to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.’”88 
Though the Court ultimately derides earlier reliance upon due pro-
cess jurisprudence in developing the Agins formulation as “regrettably 
imprecise,”89 it nonetheless finds this reliance understandable given that 
Agins was the first case presented to the Court in decades involving a 
challenge to zoning regulations; it was logical for the Court to “turn to 
these seminal zoning precedents for guidance.”90 Additionally, when 
Agins was decided, the distinction between takings jurisprudence and due 
process had been blurred by the Court’s tendency to “refe[r] to depriva-
tions of property without due process of law as ‘takings.’”91 Also, the 
Court had not by that time clarified whether regulatory takings claims 
were cognizable under the Takings Clause or the Due Process Clause.92 
The Court also takes issue with what it considers to be a “means–
end test” rather than one that evaluates the extent of the imposition upon 
private-property rights.93 The “substantially advances” language in 
Agins, rather than inquiring into the “magnitude or character of the bur-
den” represented by a regulation, asks instead only about the regulation’s 
efficacy in furthering a legitimate state interest.94 In this sense, the Agins 
formulation is distinguished from the aforementioned Loretto, Lucas, and 
Penn Central tests, and it does not accurately assess whether private 
property has been taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment.95 
Non-doctrinal considerations also contribute to the Court’s deter-
mination to dislodge Agins from the regulatory takings regime. As a 
means–end test, the “substantially advances” language would require 
lower courts to evaluate the effectiveness of a panoply of statutes, which 
is a task that the Court feels would allow “courts to substitute their pre-
                                                 
 88. Id. at 541 (quoting Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)). 
 89. Id. at 542. 
 90. Id. at 541. 
 91. Id. (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 740 (1970)). 
 92. Id. at 541–42 (citing Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 
U.S. 172, 197–99 (1985)). 
 93. Id. at 542–43. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 542. The Court again notes that the Agins standard is more akin to a due process 
evaluation than a proper takings one. Id. It fails to consider how the regulatory burden is distributed 
amongst property owners, which the Court has noted is an integral policy rationale supporting tak-
ings jurisprudence. Id.; Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960). In Armstrong, the Court 
wrote that “bar[ring] Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in 
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole” is a foundational justification for 
the takings regime. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49. 
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dictive judgments for those of elected legislatures and expert agencies.”96 
As an illustration of the cumbersome nature of this proposition, the Court 
points to Lingle itself.97 In considering the challenge to Act 257, lower 
courts were presented with testimony from multiple reputable economists 
who presented conflicting opinions as to whether Act 257 would indeed 
help prevent concentration and inflated gasoline prices.98 By forcing 
lower courts to second-guess acts of the legislature, the language in 
Agins compelled courts to perform not only a role to which they are ill-
suited, but one that withholds the deference due to legislatures by the 
judiciary.99 
After the Court discards Agins as a means of evaluating regulatory 
takings, it proceeds in its wholesale reevaluation of takings jurisprudence 
to a juncture crucial for the purposes of this Comment. The Court vigor-
ously maintains—perhaps dubiously—that its determination regarding 
Agins “does not require [it] to disturb any of [its] prior holdings.”100 It 
heaps special attention upon Nollan and Dolan, conceding that although 
those cases incorporated the Agins language, they did not rely upon the 
“substantially advances” test to support their holdings.101 Instead, the 
Court maintains that Nollan and Dolan are “special application[s]” of the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which is mentioned only in pass-
ing in both decisions.102 The Court uses the occasion of Lingle to declare 
that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which holds that “the 
government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right—
here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a 
public use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the 
government where the benefit has little or no relationship to the proper-
ty,”103 is not a new rationale for Nollan and Dolan, but was, unbe-
knownst to most, the justification for them all along.104 
                                                 
 96. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544. 
 97. Id. at 544–45 (“[T]he District Court was required to choose between the views of two op-
posing economists as to whether Hawaii’s rent control statute would help to prevent concentra-
tion . . . . The reasons for deference to legislative judgments about the need for, and likely effective-
ness of, regulatory actions are by now well established.”). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 545. “The reasons for deference to legislative judgments about the need for, and 
likely effectiveness of, regulatory actions are by now well established, and we think they are no less 
applicable here.” Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 547 (“Although Nollan and Dolan quoted Agins’ language, the rule those decisions 
established is entirely distinct from the “substantially advances” test we address today.”). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1987). 
 104. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547–48. 
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IV. LINGLE AND THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS 
SUPPORT MAKING LEGISLATIVELY DETERMINED EXACTIONS ELIGIBLE 
FOR NOLLAN AND DOLAN HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 
Burling and Owen succinctly describe the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions as pertaining to exchanges in which “the government 
gives a benefit to a person in exchange for something from the owner of 
which the government would not ordinarily be entitled.”105 In the case of 
land-use exactions, the pertinent exchange involves a property owner’s 
forfeiture of his Fifth Amendment right to be compensated for a taking of 
his property and the government’s subsequent relinquishment of the 
building permit sought.106 
The Lingle Court’s substitution of the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions for the Agins “substantially advances” formula, and the rea-
sons given for the substitution, help illuminate exactly why it is improper 
to exclude legislatively determined exactions from eligibility for Nollan 
and Dolan analysis. Justice O’Connor cites107 a much-referenced formu-
lation of the underlying goal of the Takings Clause, which was first ar-
ticulated in Armstrong v. United States.108 The Armstrong formulation 
notes that the regime of takings jurisprudence aims not to “prohibit the 
taking of private property,”109 but to “bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.”110 Takings jurisprudence, 
therefore, is a centrally distributive inquiry; compensation is occasioned 
when a property owner is asked to bear a regulatory burden that his 
neighbor should rightfully share. 
A concern for distribution of the burden posed by regulation must 
therefore undergird any evaluation of regulatory takings. Relying upon 
the Agins “substantially advances” language to inform whether a regula-
tion effects a taking omits an inquiry into the distribution or extent of the 
regulation. As Justice O’Connor notes, “the ‘substantially advances’ in-
quiry reveals nothing about the magnitude or character of the burden a 
particular regulation imposes upon private property rights. Nor does it 
provide any information about how any regulatory burden is distributed 
among property owners.”111 Instead of properly focusing upon the distri-
bution of the burden, the Agins language asks only whether the regula-
                                                 
 105. Burling & Owen, supra note 20, at 410. 
 106. See supra text accompanying note 103. 
 107. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537. 
 108. 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
 109. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 536 (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale 
v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987)). 
 110. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49. 
 111. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542.  
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tion is effective in advancing a state interest.112 This inquiry does not 
necessarily reveal anything about burden distribution, as “[t]he owners of 
a property subject to a regulation that effectively serves a legitimate state 
interest may be just as singled out and just as burdened as the owner of a 
property subject to an ineffective regulation.”113 Consequently, the reli-
ance upon Agins “misses the point.”114 
What Lingle calls for, then, is a regime of takings analysis that in-
corporates the factors that O’Connor finds lacking in the Agins lan-
guage:115 the magnitude and character of the burden caused by a particu-
lar piece of land-use regulation. The legislative/adjudicative distinction 
introduced by the Court in Dolan116—and which “gave little guidance as 
to its theoretical purpose”117—has led to differing interpretations by low-
er courts118 of the distinction’s “operative significance.”119 
A number of courts have held, based on the legislative/adjudicative 
distinction referenced in Dolan,120 that the Nollan/Dolan scrutiny should 
not be applied to exactions that have been imposed legislatively. In 
Home Builders Association of Dayton and the Miami Valley v. City of 
Beavercreek, the Supreme Court of Ohio found that because Nollan and 
Dolan “dealt with [ad hoc] land use exactions that forced property own-
ers to dedicate a certain portion of their land to public use,” exactions 
implemented legislatively should not be subject to the same evalua-
tion.121 The courts that adopt this approach typically cite a concern for a 
heightened risk of extortion as the reason for observing the distinction.122 
Christopher T. Goodin provides a helpful summary of this rationale in 
                                                 
 112. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (“The application of a general zoning 
law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate 
state interests.”). 
 113. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543 (emphasis in original). 
 114. Matthew Baker, Much Ado About Nollan/Dolan: The Comparative Nature of the Legisla-
tive-Adjudicative Distinction in Exactions, 42 URB. LAW. 171, 191 (2010). 
 115. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542. 
 116. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994). 
The sort of land use regulations discussed in the cases just cited, however, differ in two 
relevant particulars from the present case. First, they involved essentially legislative de-
terminations classifying entire areas of the city, whereas here the city made an adjudica-
tive decision to condition petitioner’s application for a building permit on an individual 
parcel. Second, the conditions imposed were not simply a limitation on the use petitioner 
might make of her own parcel, but a requirement that she deed portions of the property to 
the city.  
Id. 
 117. Baker, supra note 114, at 177. 
 118. See infra Part I. 
 119. Baker, supra note 114, at 177. 
 120. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. 
 121. Home Builders Ass’n v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349, 355 (Ohio 2000). 
 122. Baker, supra note 114, at 179. 
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his analysis of the California Supreme Court’s frequently referenced de-
cision in Ehrlich v. City of Culver City:123 
[F]irst, Dolan is triggered by cases “exhibiting circumstances which 
increase the risk that the local permitting authority will seek to 
avoid the obligation to pay just compensation.” Second, such cir-
cumstances are present chiefly in the discretionary context, which 
“presents an inherent and heightened risk that local government will 
manipulate the police power to impose conditions unrelated to legit-
imate land use regulatory ends, thereby avoiding what would oth-
erwise be an obligation to pay just compensation.” Third, that type 
of manipulation was not present in ministerial, “legislatively formu-
lated,” “broadly applicable fees,” which are thus subject to a lesser 
standard of scrutiny.124 
Courts adopting this formalistic approach also express concern for 
deference to legislative bodies in addition to extortion imposed through 
ad hoc mechanisms.125 
Conversely, other courts have opted to apply the Nollan/Dolan 
analysis to legislatively imposed exactions as well as ad hoc ones.126 
Still, other courts incorporate the legislative origin of an exaction as one 
factor for consideration when determining whether to apply heightened 
scrutiny or a Penn Central analysis.127 These courts place diminished 
emphasis on the source of burden, focusing instead on the character and 
nature of an imposition. Another factor considered by courts that opt not 
to observe the formalistic approach is the “degree of discretion possessed 
or exercised by the body imposing the exaction.”128 Also, courts adopting 
this approach tend to voice concern about the potential for legislatures to 
“‘gang up’ on particular groups to force extractions that a majority of 
                                                 
 123. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996). 
 124. Christopher T. Goodwin, Comment, Dolan v. City of Tigard and the Distinction Between 
Administrative and Legislative Exactions: “A Distinction Without a Constitutional Difference,” 28 
U. HAW. L. REV. 139, 151 (citations to Ehrlich omitted). 
 125. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 996 
(Ariz. 1997) (“Development or impact fees are presumed valid as exercises by legislative bodies of 
the power to regulate land use.”); Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 459 (“Nollan and Dolan in most cases impose 
no additional constitutional burden on the government to justify development fees beyond the bur-
den it already bears under the state constitution and statute.”). 
 126. See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); 
Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004). 
 127. See, e.g., Curtis v. Town of S. Thomaston, 708 A.2d 657 (Me. 1998). “[I]nquiry into 
rough proportionality does not end at this legislative determination, but we assign weight to the fact 
that the easement requirement derives from a legislative rule of general applicability and not an ad 
hoc determination.” Id. at 660. 
 128. Baker, supra note 114, at 180. 
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constituents would not only tolerate but applaud,”129 with the protection 
of reduced scrutiny due to the legislative nature of the exactions. 
The abundance of divergent jurisprudence in applying the legisla-
tive/adjudicative distinction has created a morass that begs for revision. 
Critics and scholars are virtually uniform in a call for a more workable 
standard for applying Nollan and Dolan analyses.130 The form of the pro-
posed revisions, however, varies considerably. Some observers propose 
applying heightened scrutiny to all exactions, regardless of origin.131 
Others propose either modifying the Nollan/Dolan test itself132 or adopt-
ing a new test for when application of heightened scrutiny should be 
triggered.133 
Additionally, the Court’s “special application”134 of the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions in Nollan and Dolan impliedly supports a test 
that allows legislatively imposed exactions to be evaluated under height-
ened scrutiny. Though critics argue that the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine applies to all exactions, legislative and adjudicative alike,135 the 
brief section of Lingle that addresses Nollan/Dolan and the doctrine of 
                                                 
 129. Flower Mound, 135 S.W.3d at 641. 
 130. See, e.g., Joshua P. Borden, Derailing Penn Central: A Post-Lingle, Cost-Basis Approach 
to Regulatory Takings, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 870, 871 (2010) (“[T]he Court’s current method of 
regulatory takings analysis is fraught with so many issues that one cannot help but believe that a 
better, sounder, approach must exist.”); Richard A. Epstein, How to Solve (or Avoid) the Exactions 
Problem, 72 MO. L. REV 973, 992 (2007) (“The only way that we can solve the exaction problems 
created by current Supreme Court doctrine is to junk the anemic constitutional definitions of private 
property tied to possession in favor of the more robust system of property rights.”). 
 131. See, e.g., J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the “Essential Nexus”: How State and Fed-
eral Courts Have Applied Nollan and Dolan and Where They Should Go From Here, 59 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 373, 376 (2002) (“[C]ourts should apply the . . . test equally to all land use conditions.”); 
Steven A. Haskins, Closing the Dolan Deal–Bridging the Legislative/Adjudicative Divide, 38 URB. 
LAW. 487, 491 (2006) (“Applying the Dolan test to all exactions will provide a proper constitutional 
framework to gird the exactions process, providing the foundation on which landowners and gov-
ernments can work together.”). 
 132. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball & Laurie Reynolds, Exactions and Burden Distribution in Tak-
ings Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513, 1521 (2006) (proposing a modification of Nollan and 
Dolan that would require “courts . . . to inquire whether the exaction program in question is 
underinclusive, that is, whether owners who are similarly situated to the plaintiff owner are required 
to provide similar exactions”). 
 133. Jane C. Needleman, Exactions: Exploring Exactly When Nollan and Dolan Should be 
Triggered, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1563, 1565 (2006) (proposing that “the Nollan/Dolan analysis 
should be triggered by judicial challenges to conditions that local municipalities place on develop-
ment permits when the actual exaction imposed could not otherwise be acquired by the municipality 
outside the development permit context”). 
 134. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005). 
 135. See Breemer, supra note 131, at 401–02 (“[C]ourts should not limit the essential nexus 
test to administrative exactions because no distinction between legislative and administrative condi-
tions exists in unconstitutional conditions cases.”); Haskins, supra note 131, at 504–05 (“[T]he dis-
tinction is simply not relevant where the question is not whether the taking is ‘fair,’ but whether the 
taking is ‘justly compensated.’”). 
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unconstitutional conditions contains no indication that the doctrine—and, 
by extension, the heightened scrutiny represented by the twin deci-
sions—should be applied to any particular breed of exactions.136 Indeed, 
the only mention that Justice O’Connor makes of the character of an ex-
action is when she prefatorily notes that both decisions “involved Fifth 
Amendment takings challenges to adjudicative land-use exactions.”137 
The application of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to 
Nollan/Dolan is not indicative of which exactions are suitable for height-
ened scrutiny; it merely pertains to the analysis of whether an exaction 
rises to the level of a taking once the determination has been made that 
the exaction in question merits Nollan/Dolan inquiry. 
Also, as Matthew Baker points out, the Court’s application of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to Nollan/Dolan is simply duplica-
tive of the test already elucidated by those decisions.138 Lingle provides 
that, within the context of exactions, the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions mandates that “the government may not require a person to 
give up a constitutional right—here the right to receive just compensa-
tion when property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a discre-
tionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit has little 
or no relationship to the property.”139 Thus, the doctrine’s requirement 
that the property forfeited bear a relationship with the permit granted by 
the government is simply a reiteration of Nollan and Dolan’s nexus and 
proportionality standard. Lingle’s “special application”140 of the doctrine 
neither augments nor alters the existing Nollan/Dolan test.141 
Consequently, contrary to scholars’ arguments142 that the substitu-
tion of the Agins formulation with the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions in the exactions context clarifies when the heightened scrutiny of 
Nollan and Dolan apply, the substitution actually offers no help to lower 
courts attempting to discern to which exactions the standard should ap-
ply. The Court’s demurral on providing guidance on the takings evalua-
tion of exactions creates a void that is logically filled by the balancing 
test that this Comment advocates. 
                                                 
 136. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546–48. 
 137. Id. at 546. 
 138. Baker, supra note 114, at 196 (“[T]he Nollan/Dolan test is the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine in the exactions context.”) (emphasis in original). 
 139. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547. 
 140. Id. 
 141. “The doctrine simply has no power independent of the Nollan/Dolan formulation.” Baker, 
supra note 114, at 196. 
 142. See supra note 118. 
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Accordingly, this Comment proposes that the much-maligned143 
muddle of exactions taking analysis be replaced by a balancing test that 
incorporates a consideration of whether the regulation’s burden falls dis-
proportionately on an individual or small group of citizens, and therefore 
merits heightened scrutiny, or whether the burden is borne by the public 
at large, which should yield the relaxed scrutiny of Penn Central.144 This 
balancing test will, in effect, reformulate the legislative/adjudicative dis-
tinction, which has proven so inconsistent and troublesome in its applica-
tion.145 The test will treat an exaction as “legislative” based not upon its 
method of conception and implementation, but upon its scope. Conse-
quently, an exaction imposed by a legislative body, such as a require-
ment that housing developments construct roads or throughways, will 
nonetheless be eligible for consideration under Nollan/Dolan, and an 
exaction imposed on an ad hoc basis could potentially be analyzed under 
Penn Central. 
The notion that the legislative/adjudicative distinction be recon-
ceived as an inquiry into the contours of a regulation’s burden is con-
sistent with the Court’s opinions in Nollan and Dolan. In Nollan, while 
Justice Scalia’s opinion did not explicitly reference the origin of the chal-
lenged regulation,146 he identified the central issue for the purpose of tak-
ings analysis as whether “the Nollans were being singled out to bear the 
burden of California’s attempt to remedy these problems, although they 
had not contributed to it more than other coastal landowners.”147 Alt-
hough Nollan does not attempt to delineate a legislative/adjudicative dis-
tinction, it does emphasize that a land use regulation is unjustified if it 
asks an individual alone to contribute toward the public interest.148 
Dolan also nods approvingly149 at the Court’s language in Arm-
strong. Chief Justice Rehnquist introduces Dolan’s challenge as a ques-
tion of whether the “government [has] forc[ed] some people alone to 
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole.”150 Chief Justice Rehnquist also introduces a legis-
lative/adjudicative distinction, but in a manner that inquires beyond the 
mere method of implementation: 
                                                 
 143. See supra notes 5–8. 
 144. See generally Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 145. See supra notes 5–8. 
 146. See supra Part II. 
 147. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987). 
 148. Id. at 841. “The Commission may be right that [the regulation] is a good idea, but that 
does not establish that the Nollans (and other coastal residents) alone can be compelled to contribute 
to its realization.” Id. 
 149. Justice Scalia also quotes the Armstrong language in Nollan. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 n.4 
(quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
 150. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49). 
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The sort of land use regulations discussed in the cases just cited, 
however, differ in two relevant particulars from the present case. 
First, they involved essentially legislative determinations classifying 
entire areas of the city, whereas here the city made an adjudicative 
decision to condition petitioner’s application for a building permit 
on an individual parcel.151 
Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist tethers the identification of legisla-
tive and adjudicative land use regulations to the question not of the 
method of implementation, but of whether the regulation has singled out 
individual property owners for special treatment. This distinction makes 
a natural threshold inquiry for Nollan/Dolan treatment—it flags regula-
tions that pose a heightened risk of violating the Armstrong principle and 
therefore should not merit the deference to legislative bodies that the 
Court has found desirable. Consequently, organizing a balancing test 
around the question of burden distribution is a workable way of identify-
ing claims that are conducive to Nollan/Dolan analysis without stepping 
on the toes of legislative bodies. The proposition, advanced by some crit-
ics,152 that all exactions be subjected to heightened scrutiny would un-
necessarily sweep some legislatively imposed land use regulations into 
Nollan/Dolan examination that do not comport with the standard identi-
fied by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Dolan. In that proposed scenario, the 
increased Nollan/Dolan scrutiny would impede the government’s ability 
to engage in widespread land-use planning by endangering “essentially 
legislative determinations classifying entire areas of the city,”153 rather 
than legislative determinations that focus on a smaller number of proper-
ties. 
This Comment’s proposed balancing test is not, however, a purely 
mathematical inquiry into the number of property holders that would be 
burdened by a challenged regulation. A test that focuses exclusively on 
the degree of discretion exercised by the body that implemented the 
regulation ignores the fact that even if only a single property owner is 
affected by a particular decision, this “does not mean that in the future 
that decision will not have widespread community effects.”154 Also, an 
examination only of the number of owners affected would unnecessarily 
sweep relatively benign regulations into heightened scrutiny “because 
most local land use decisions, including exactions, must be tailored to fit 
an individual development at some point and, therefore, necessarily in-
                                                 
 151. Id. at 385. 
 152. See supra note 131. 
 153. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. 
 154. Inna Reznik, Note, The Distinction Between Legislative and Adjudicative Decisions in 
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 262 (2000). 
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volve a certain amount of discretion.”155 Adhering to this narrow thresh-
old test would result in regulations being flagged for Nollan/Dolan anal-
ysis even when the regulations would not threaten to violate the Arm-
strong principle’s concern with “forcing some people alone to bear pub-
lic burdens”156 that should be shared by the community. 
To avoid an over-inclusive balancing test, a consideration not only 
of the number of landowners impacted, but also of the extent of the pub-
lic benefit, should be included. Considering the degree of discretion 
against the breadth of the benefit mitigates some of the line-drawing is-
sues that would plague a test that evaluated only the number of affected 
owners. Such a narrow test would necessarily require a court to “deter-
mine the point at which the burdened group no longer qualifies as dis-
crete.”157 Without consideration of additional factors, this approach sug-
gests that a simple numerical distinction could be used to eliminate the 
exactions muddle. Incorporating an analysis of the extent of the public 
burden more precisely addresses Armstrong’s concern about burdens 
that, “in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.”158 As the extent of a public burden wanes, the fairness interest in 
spreading the burden that serves would also be diminished. In such a 
scenario, there would exist a reduced interest in subjecting the pertinent 
regulation to heightened scrutiny. Whether Nollan/Dolan analysis would 
be appropriate would depend upon a comparison of the fairness interest 
with the number of owners affected. Thus, the balancing test would 
avoid the tendency toward using a fixed numerical cutoff of the number 
of burdened property owners to determine whether a regulation qualifies 
for heightened scrutiny. 
V. THE BALANCING TEST APPLIED TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING 
IN MCCLUNG V. CITY OF SUMNER 
In McClung, the Ninth Circuit was presented with its first post-
Lingle exactions challenge when a Washington State property owner 
challenged as an unconstitutional taking a municipal ordinance that re-
quired new developments to install storm pipes with a minimum diame-
ter of twelve inches.159 
                                                 
 155. Breemer, supra note 131, at 406. 
 156. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 157. Baker, supra note 114, at 192. 
 158. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49. 
 159. See McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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A. Background and Procedural Posture 
During the early nineties, the City of Sumner was plagued by then-
record flooding.160 In response, the City adopted Ordinance 1603 in late 
1993, which instituted a swath of stormwater management regulations 
and requirements, including the aforementioned mandate that new con-
struction projects use pipes with a diameter of at least twelve inches.161 
Roughly six months after Ordinance 1603 was signed into law, the 
McClungs sought permission from the City to convert residential proper-
ties they had acquired during the eighties and early nineties into a sand-
wich shop and to pave the adjoining alley to use it for the store’s park-
ing.162 In the course of discussing the potential development with the 
City, the parties discovered that the storm pipe that ran under the proper-
ty was of a twelve-inch diameter for only four feet before switching to 
six inches for the remaining 350 feet.163 The city engineer sent a letter to 
the McClungs proffering a deal to cure the Ordinance 1603 violation: 
To correct existing deficiencies, meet the needs of your develop-
ment and satisfy the future requirements as outlined in the Storm 
Water Comprehensive plan, a 24-inch diameter storm drain is to be 
installed as a condition of development. 
As a developer, you are required to install a 12-inch storm drain as a 
minimum. My estimate shows the cost difference between a 12-inch 
and a 24-inch diameter pipe ranges from $7,200 to $7,500. To offset 
the cost of the oversizing to meet the City’s Comprehensive Plan 
requirements, the City will waive the storm drainage General Facili-
ties Charge, permit fees, plan review and inspection charges of the 
storm drainage systems for both the development and the Subway 
Shop.164 
Following receipt of the engineer’s letter, the McClungs incorpo-
rated a twenty-four-inch storm pipe into their plans for the development, 
which were approved, enabling the pipe to be installed in 1996.165 
Two years later, the McClungs filed a complaint against the City, 
claiming a number of Washington state law violations.166 After years of 
litigation, the McClungs were allowed to amend their complaint to in-
                                                 
 160. Id. at 1222; Scott Sistek, Record Flooding as Strong Storm Pushes into Northwest, 
KOMONEWS.COM (Nov. 7, 2006), http://www.komonews.com/news/local/4583077.html. 
 161. Sumner, Wash., Ordinance 1603 (Sept. 7, 1993), available at http://sumner.fileprosite 
.com/Documents/DocumentList.aspx?ID=276. 
 162. McClung, 548 F.3d at 1222. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 1222–23 (alteration in original). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
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clude an allegation that the City’s requirement that the storm pipe be up-
graded effected a Fifth Amendment taking.167 The United States District 
Court for the Western District of Washington evaluated the Ordinance’s 
original twelve-inch requirement separately from the subsequent agree-
ment to install a twenty-four-inch pipe in exchange for fee waivers.168 
The court evaluated the Ordinance’s twelve-inch requirement using 
the Penn Central framework, and found that the requirement did not con-
stitute a taking.169 The court subsequently determined that the agreement 
to install a twenty-four-inch pipe was not cognizable as a taking, but was 
a contract between the McClungs and the City.170 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Analysis 
The Ninth Circuit notes at the outset of its analysis that the issue of 
whether a legislatively imposed land-use exaction should be evaluated 
under the Penn Central or Nollan/Dolan framework is one of first im-
pression for the court.171 
The court sees Ordinance 1603 as plainly distinguished from the 
regulations at issue in Nollan and Dolan, and consequently as outside the 
scope of its analysis. Unlike the regulations in those two cases, Ordi-
nance 1603 does not require “an individual, adjudicative decision”;172 
rather, it is akin to the “legislative determinations classifying entire areas 
of the city”173 that Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his Dolan opinion, sug-
gested would not be subject to a Nollan/Dolan analysis. Additionally, 
and most crucially, Ordinance 1603 requires no relinquishment of rights 
in real property, unlike the adjudicative determinations in Nollan and 
Dolan, which conditioned development permits upon dedication of prop-
erty.174 The Ninth Circuit believes that extending Nollan/Dolan analysis 
to regulations such as Ordinance 1603 “would subject any regulation 
governing development to higher scrutiny and raise the concern of judi-
cial interference with the exercise of local government police powers.”175 
                                                 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. (citing Tapps Brewing, Inc. v. City of Sumner, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1228–31 (W.D. 
Wash. 2007)). 
 170. Id. at 1231. 
 171. Id. at 1225. 
 172. Id. at 1227. 
 173. Id. (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 687 (1994)). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 1228. 
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C. Applying the Balancing Test to Ordinance 1603 
In determining whether Ordinance 1603 is eligible for 
Nollan/Dolan evaluation, the Ninth Circuit fumbles toward an inquiry 
resembling the balancing test proposed by this Comment, yet ultimately 
rests upon a formal distinction between legislatively and adjudicatively 
imposed regulations. While the court quotes Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
articulation of the legislative/adjudicative distinction in Dolan,176 which 
suggests that its decision incorporates an evaluation of Ordinance 1603 
based upon Dolan’s non-formal conception of the distinction,177 the court 
relies upon a two-prong test to determine that Ordinance 1603 should be 
evaluated under the Penn Central framework.178 The court’s test ex-
cludes any mention of the Armstrong principle—that the intent of takings 
jurisprudence is to bar the government from forcing select citizens to 
shoulder burdens that should be borne by the public at large.179 Further, 
and the court does not attempt to evaluate the distribution and extent of 
the regulation’s burden.180 
While an application of the balancing test proposed by this Com-
ment would similarly result in evaluating Ordinance 1603 under the Penn 
Central framework, it would not rely exclusively on the manner of im-
plementation and the classification of the burden itself.181 In the case of 
Ordinance 1603, the regulation was enacted to effect a substantial public 
                                                 
 176. Id. at 1227 (quoting Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385). 
 177. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 178. McClung, 548 F.3d at 1227. “Unlike Nollan and Dolan, the facts of this case involve 
neither an individual, adjudicative decision, nor the requirement that the McClungs relinquish rights 
in their real property.” Id. 
 179. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (determining that underlying takings 
jurisprudence is an interest in “bar[ring] Government from forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole”). 
 180. See McClung, 548 F.3d 1219. 
 181. The Ninth Circuit contends in McClung that Nollan/Dolan analysis is reserved only for 
regulations that constitute exactions. See McClung, 548 F.3d at 1227. This contention is supported 
by the Supreme Court’s ruling in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 
687 (1999). In that case, the Court held that it has “not extended the rough-proportionality test of 
Dolan beyond the special context of exactions—land-use decisions conditioning approval of devel-
opment on the dedication of property to public use.” Id. at 702 (emphasis added). Consequently, the 
question of whether a regulation is an exaction is a threshold inquiry, albeit one that is beyond the 
scope of this Comment. There is much imprecision regarding the term’s use, and scholars have 
reached no consensus on a definition. See, e.g., Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitu-
tional Shadow: The Institutional Contexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 775 n.7 (2007) (“I 
will use the general term ‘exactions’ to refer to all conditions on development, including the dedica-
tion of land, fees in lieu of dedication, or impact fees.”); Needleman, supra note 133 at 1590 n.3 
(“Development exactions may be defined as contributions to a governmental entity imposed as a 
condition precedent to approving the developer’s project.”). At least one article has referred to Ordi-
nance 1603 as an exaction. See Burling & Owen, supra note 20, at 437 (“In McClung v. City of 
Sumner, the Court analyzed an exaction requirement whereby a landowner was required to upscale a 
water line.”). 
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good that would serve the entire community.182 Prior to the Ordinance’s 
adoption, flooding in Sumner and surrounding areas had forced residents 
to evacuate during periods of heavy rainfall.183 Consequently, the Ordi-
nance benefitted the city’s entire community. In applying the proposed 
balancing test, regulations that offer a widespread public benefit are at a 
heightened risk of violating the Armstrong principle by heaping upon 
select landowners a burden that should rightfully be borne by the public 
at large.184 
Ordinance 1603, however, escapes Nollan/Dolan scrutiny by allo-
cating the regulatory burden equally to “most new developments.”185 
While Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Dolan does not contemplate 
heightened scrutiny only for exactions that burden a single parcel or 
owner, it specifically holds out regulations that “classif[y] entire areas of 
[a] city” as representative of exactions to which the relaxed Penn Central 
standard would apply.186 Ordinance 1603 offsets its vast public benefit 
by distributing the regulation’s burden widely, thus escaping heightened 
scrutiny. 
Application of the balancing test helps delineate between factors 
that are relevant for the threshold inquiry of whether a regulation should 
be evaluated under heightened scrutiny, and those that pertain to the in-
quiry of whether a taking has occurred. The imprecision of the Supreme 
Court’s takings jurisprudence had led, in some courts, to the conflation 
of the threshold test with the takings question itself.187 In evaluating Or-
dinance 1603, the Ninth Circuit improperly incorporates part of the 
Nollan/Dolan analysis into its consideration of whether to examine the 
                                                 
 182. Sistek, supra note 160. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 185. McClung, 548 F.3d at 1222. 
 186. Ordinance 1603 can be distinguished from “middle ground” cases such as Parking Ass’n 
v. City of Atlanta, which concerned an ordinance that required roughly 350 Atlanta parking lots to 
incorporate landscaped spaces equivalent to ten percent of the paved area, and to plant one tree for 
every eight parking spaces contained in the lot. 515 U.S. 1116 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (deny-
ing certiorari). Though more than a few landowners were burdened by the regulation, the burden 
included forfeited revenue from lost parking spaces, and in some cases, the trees would obscure 
signage on the lot and prevent owners from selling advertising. Id. at 1117–18 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing). Due to the extent of the burden placed upon a disproportionate few landowners, this case would 
present a closer call for the balancing test proposed. 
 187. Justice Thomas himself, in his dissent to the denial of certiorari in the Parking Ass’n case, 
wondered “why the existence of a taking should turn on the type of governmental entity responsible 
for the taking,” and noted that “[a] city council can take property just as well as a planning commis-
sion can.” 515 U.S. at 1118 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Though Justice Thomas is correct that the form 
of an exaction is not dispositive for the purposes of the takings inquiry, he makes the mistake of 
folding the legislative/adjudicative distinction into the takings question rather than the threshold 
determination. The distinction is relevant in determining whether to flag a regulation for heightened 
scrutiny, not in performing the takings analysis itself. 
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ordinance under heightened scrutiny. The court reasons that because new 
developments place an additional burden on the city’s sewer system, re-
quiring that new developments adhere to an expanded pipe diameter is 
not “a wholly unrelated interest.”188 In the court’s mind, the connection 
between the burden and the public benefit supporting the regulation sug-
gests relaxed scrutiny.189 However, the question of whether a regulation’s 
burden relates to the bestowed benefit is precisely the question imposed 
by Nollan. By incorporating that test as part of the threshold inquiry, the 
Ninth Circuit has taken the peculiar step of using Nollan’s test against 
itself, deflecting claims that might survive Nollan scrutiny from ever 
reaching it. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite the recent efforts of the Supreme Court to provide a regime 
of takings jurisprudence that would produce a consistent, relatively uni-
form body of law from lower courts, the confusion and divergent out-
comes that have characterized this area of law persist. This Comment 
proposes a test that would balance the various policy interests identified 
by the Court, such as preserving the government’s ability to engage in 
land-use planning, while simultaneously serving judicial economy by 
efficiently flagging claims most suited for heightened scrutiny. This bal-
ancing test would preserve Armstrong’s interest in preventing the gov-
ernment from disproportionately heaping burdens on individuals to effect 
a widespread public benefit. By identifying only those regulations that 
run afoul of fairness principles, the test does not compromise the Court’s 
stated interest in providing a measure of deference to legislative bodies. 
Instead, it provides a set of clear principles to guide lower courts that will 
imbue a neglected area of law with much-needed predictability and con-
sistency. 
                                                 
 188. McClung, 548 F.3d at 1225 n.3. 
 189. Id. 
